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Argument
Dr. James Hansen’s 1988 testimony before the U.S. Senate was an important turning point
in the history of global climate change. However, no studies have explained why Hansen’s
scientiﬁc communication in this deliberative setting was more successful than his testimonies
of 1986 and 1987. This article turns to Hansen as an important case study in the rhetoric of
accommodated science, illustrating how Hansen successfully accommodated his rhetoric to his
non-scientist audience given his historical conditions and rhetorical constraints. This article (1)
provides a richer explanation for the rhetorical/political emergence of global warming as an
important public policy issue in the United States during the late 1980s and (2) contributes to
scholarly understanding of the rhetoric of accommodated science in deliberative settings, an
often overlooked area of science communication research.

Standing on the promontory of the rocky rims in Billings, Montana, there is usually
a distinct horizontal line between the clear, blue sky and the white, snowcapped
Beartooth Mountains. But the summer of 1988 was different. A fuzzy, reddish tint
lingered across the once pristine skyline of “Big Sky Country.” The reason: More
than one hundred miles to the south, Yellowstone National Park smoldered in one of
the most devastating forest ﬁres of the twentieth century (Anon. 1988, A18; Stevens
1999, 129–130). But that was not the only thing about 1988 that was extraordinary:
New York and Washington D.C. consistently saw the mercury rise to more than 100
degrees Fahrenheit, America’s breadbasket experienced droughts reminiscent of the
1930s Dust Bowl, and the water level of the mighty Mississippi River sank to an
all-time low. Across the United States it seemed that there were ominous warnings of
accelerated global climate change.
In June of the same year, members of the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources gathered in a meeting that would thrust global climate change into
the public spotlight. According to the committee’s chair, Senator Timothy E. Wirth
(D-CO), the purpose of the committee meeting was to “ﬁgure out how to deal with
this emergency” (U.S. Congress 1988, 1). In his opening statement, Wirth recognized
the importance of climate change for public policy: “In the last week many of us have
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been seeing ﬁrsthand the effects of the drought that is occurring across the heart of the
country” and “as drought conditions have clearly demonstrated, those considerations
stretch across the public policy spectrum” (ibid., 5). The committee’s Senators were
well aware of the weather conditions. Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) said the land
in his state looked like a “moonscape” because of the drought (ibid., 31). Senator
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) put the scorching heat of the year, and the entire decade, into
perspective: “And now we know that the four warmest years in the last 130 years – the
four hottest years of the last 130 years – have occurred since 1980” (ibid., 38). However,
the unusual weather was not the only reason 1988 was to be remembered. For the
ﬁrst time, global climate change became a signiﬁcant public and policy concern in the
United States. In previous decades climate change was only occasionally mentioned
outside of scientiﬁc circles, but in the late 1980 s, the public and policymakers emerged
from the periphery to positions of prominence in global climate change discussions in
part because of the public advocacy of a then little-known scientist.
Although many climate scientists testiﬁed before Congress in the late 1980s, taking
advantage of the opportune climate conditions of the time, many observed how
the Congressional testimony of Dr. James Hansen, a climatologist and computer
modeler working at the National Aeronautic and Space Administration’s (NASA)
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, received signiﬁcantly more notice than others
(Schneider 1990, 195; Wilford 1988, 4; Pomerance 1989, 262–268; Ungar 1992, 491–
493). Hansen’s 1988 testimony effectively garnered the attention of journalists and
political elites. During his testimony before the Senate committee on June 23, Hansen
announced to the mediated world “with 99 percent conﬁdence” that global warming
was a real phenomenon (U.S. Congress 1988, 39). Following Hansen’s testimony, Dr.
Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund marveled: “I’ve never seen
an environmental issue mature so quickly, shifting from science to the policy realm
almost overnight” (Wilford 1988, 4). Although some scientists were skeptical of his
conviction, viewing his claims to be unjustiﬁed based on his data, to environmentalists
“Hansen became an instant hero” (Stevens 1999, 133). Historian of science Spencer
Weart argued that evidence of Hansen’s inﬂuence has been captured in public opinion
polls: In a 1981 poll, when asked whether or not they had heard or read about the
greenhouse effect, only 38 per cent of respondents said they had. In a 1989 poll,
just after James Hansen helped to thrust climate change into the public spotlight, 79
per cent of respondents indicated they had heard or read about the greenhouse effect
(Weart 2003, 156). Over time, Hansen’s testimony became an important touchstone
for debate as recent scholarly treatments of global climate change history have observed
(Christianson 1999, 199; Weart 2003, 156).
Saying Hansen’s scientiﬁc communication was successful in garnering public
attention is relatively uncontroversial; however, attempts to explain why have not
yet emerged in scholarly treatments of global climate change. I contend Hansen’s
1988 success is rooted in his gradual development of a rhetorical sensitivity to his
non-scientist audiences: journalists, policymakers, and the general public. In other
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words, Hansen learned to engage in what rhetorical scholars call the rhetoric of
“accommodating science” (Fahnestock 1998; Groenewegen 2002; Pellechia 1997). By
comparing Hansen’s 1986 and 1987 Congressional testimonies with his more effective
1988 testimony, I show how Hansen accommodated his message to adapt his research
to non-scientiﬁc audiences given the rhetorical constraints and conditions of the time.
Investigating James Hansen’s rhetoric of the late 1980s is warranted not just because
he plays an important role in the history of global climate change science dissemination
to wider audiences. Hansen’s rhetoric also deserves our attention because his case can
inform scholarly understanding of the rhetoric of accommodating science, rhetoric
aimed at adapting scientiﬁc knowledge and information to situated, non-scientiﬁc
audiences. Jeanne Fahnestock noted in her classic treatment of accommodating science
why additional scholarly work in this area of rhetorical theory is needed: “The way
information changes as a function of rhetorical situation certainly deserves scholarly
scrutiny beyond this preliminary study, for at issue is the machinery and quality of social
decision making in an expert-dominated age” (Fahnestock 1998, 346). However, as
we will soon discover, the literature on accommodating rhetoric is heavily slanted
in favor of examining forensic and epideictic rhetoric while overlooking the role of
accommodated rhetoric in deliberative settings.
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. In the ﬁrst section I
review the rhetoric of accommodating science literature. The second section situates
Hansen’s testimonials and expertise in the context of late 1980 s climate science. Third,
I examine key rhetorical changes Hansen made between his less successful 1986 and
1987 and his more successful 1988 testimonies; here I discuss both Hansen’s written
and spoken works in relation to their speciﬁc contexts and constraints. As we shall
see, Hansen’s 1988 success and the rhetorical/political emergence of global warming
in U.S. discourse is rooted in Hansen’s gradual development of a rhetorical sensitivity
to historical conditions, rhetorical constraints, and non-scientist audiences.

The Rhetoric of Accommodating Science
Science rhetoric accommodated to a non-scientiﬁc audience is more than “simply a
matter of translating technical jargon into non-technical equivalents” (ibid., 335). The
act of accommodation involves audience adaptation as information moves from the
technical sphere of science into public circulation. In addition, accommodated science
also takes into account changes in rhetorical situations. Based on an analysis of articles
in the journal Science and its accommodated counterparts, Fahnestock makes a number
of observations about accommodated science. For my purposes here, I wish to focus
on two of Fahnestock’s observations about accommodation rhetoric that make it more
than an issue of translation. First, Fahnestock notes that there is a “genre shift that
occurs between the original presentation of a scientist’s work and its popularization.”
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Second, there is also a change in “statement types” that increases the level of certainty
in accommodated science (ibid., 332).
Fahnestock uses Aristotle to explain what she means by a “genre shift” in accom
modated science. According to Aristotle, rhetoric can be divided into three different
classiﬁcations or genres: forensic, deliberative, and epideictic. Forensic rhetoric is con
cerned with the nature and cause of past events and is typically used in legal venues such
as courts. Deliberative rhetoric focuses on debating the best possible future action and is
usually used in political settings such as a legislature. Finally, epideictic rhetoric concerns
the judgment of praise or blame and is often used in ceremonial settings such as awards
banquets and funerals. For Fahenstock, “a case can be made for classifying original sci
entiﬁc reports as forensic discourse,” a kind of discourse concerned with establishing the
nature and cause of past events, the events being experiments and observations. Accom
modations of science rhetoric, however, are “overwhelmingly epideictic; their main
purpose is to celebrate rather than validate.” The implications of such a shift involve
a change in the nature of the content being communicated. When science rhetoric
moves from the forensic genre to the epideictic, rhetors “must usually be explicit in
their claims about the value of the scientiﬁc discoveries they pass along. They cannot
rely on the audience to recognize the signiﬁcance of information” (ibid., 333–334).
The second general observation Fahnestock makes about accommodated rhetoric
has to do with the taxonomy of “statement types” in the creation of certainty.
Borrowing from Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s canonical science studies work
Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts, Fahnestock argues that accommodated
science rhetoric uses statement types different from the original, unaccommodated
science discourse. Thus, there is a signiﬁcant change in content. According to Latour
and Woolgar, there are ﬁve basic statement types that are used in the production of
scientiﬁc papers. These statement types differ based on the amount of uncertainty
expressed by the rhetor. A type ﬁve statement “corresponds to a taken-for-granted
fact,” thus having the highest degree of certainty (Latour and Woolgar 1986, 76).
These statements are often free of references and seem self-evident to audiences. A
type four statement is less certain than a type ﬁve statement. The claim being advanced
is often uncontroversial, but it is stated in such a way that the claim is made explicit. Type
three and two statements introduce uncertainties into the rhetoric because they contain
“hedges, qualiﬁcations, or ‘modalities’ that suggest the information is not indisputable”
(Fahnestock 1998, 343; Latour and Woolgar 1986, 77). A type three statement contains
subtle elements that could decrease the level of certainty one has in a rhetor’s claims.
For example, a type three statement might contain a citation, a rhetorical feature that
suggests the claim needed evidentiary support. A type two claim contains qualiﬁcations
that are much stronger. For example, wording that suggests something “may,” “might,”
or “could be” true would detract from a statement’s level of certainty. Finally, a type
one statement is uncertain, speculative, and openly insufﬁcient.
Based on Latour and Woolgar’s taxonomy, Fahnestock concludes that
accommodated science rhetoric “trafﬁcs in statements of type 5 and 4, the exposed
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certainties, and of type 1, the weakly supported and speculative” (Fahnestock 1998,
334). In accommodated rhetoric, space and time constraints often leave “no room for
the qualiﬁcations a more knowledgeable audience would demand, qualiﬁcations that
show the author’s awareness of the criticism and refutation that an expert audience
could raise” (ibid., 338). Thus, without fear of being challenged by non-scientiﬁc
audiences, authors of accommodated rhetoric appear more certain because modalities
and hedges have been eliminated. In addition, accommodated rhetoric has the tendency
to “replace the signs or data of an original research report with the effects or results.”
In other words, questions of method and observational practice become secondary to
the scientiﬁc discovery. This emphasis on the product of science, and not the process,
allows rhetors to increase “the signiﬁcance and certainty of their subject matter” (ibid.).
When audiences are unaware of uncertainties in scientiﬁc methodology, the conclusion
appears more certain than it may actually be.
Scholars concerned with the roles of hedging and scientiﬁc uncertainty in technical
and popular discourse concur with a number of Fahnestock’s observations. Most
hedging scholars agree that “hedging is the accepted practice in the scientiﬁc
community” (Horn 2001, 1087). According to Hyland, scientists’ attempts to qualify
their claims through rhetorical devices such as hedging are “crucial to the procedures of
argumentation and claim acceptance, playing a critical role in both the social ratiﬁcation
of knowledge and the system of professional rewards and recognition that emanate from
publication” (Hyland 1996, 278). By qualifying one’s arguments, scientists engage in
the paradoxical practice of weakening their claims rather than actually strengthening
them for a particular audience.
Despite their heavy use in scientiﬁc texts written for scientiﬁc audiences, scholars
have also observed that qualiﬁers, hedges, and modalities are often omitted as the
arguments are accommodated for the general public. According to an early study
by James Tankard Jr. and Michael Ryan (1974), scientists felt journalists often left
out relevant information about methodology (over 35 per cent of the time) and
qualiﬁcations (over 31 per cent of the time). Eleanor Singer’s study likewise found that
journalists had “omitted some qualifying statements” in 60 per cent of their stories
and “consistently omitted discussion of the research methods” (Singer 1990, 109–110).
It seems clear that when journalists accommodate scientiﬁc rhetoric for the general
public, key rhetorical features, such as “contextual factors and methodological details,
are still frequently omitted” (Pellechia 1997, 61).
Although content analyses have veriﬁed that accommodated rhetoric contains fewer
caveats and qualiﬁers than the original scientiﬁc texts, other studies have examined what
effect these uncertainty-adjusting devices have on audience reception of messages.
Early writing texts and studies on the effects of hedging suggest hedging should be
avoided at all costs, calling these rhetorical devices “weakeners,” “downtoners,” and
“understatements” (Crismore and Vade Kopple 1988, 184–185). Early sociological
treatments often assumed these uncertainty devices harmed a scientist’s credibility
and detracted from “the public image of science” (Zehr 1999, 9). In other words,
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the presence of uncertainty in one’s arguments is a kind of “powerless” language
(Jensen 2008, 348). However, recent research has reversed this trend. Examining student
learning, Avon Crismore and William Vande Kopple found that “subjects who made
the greatest learning gains were not the control subjects, those who read passages
without hedges. Rather, they were those who read passages with hedges” (Crismore
and Kopple 1988, 198). Jakob Jensen (2008), in his study on news coverage about cancer
research, found that articles with caveats, limitations, and hedges actually enhanced
perceptions of trustworthiness for both the journalists writing the story and the scientists
who were addressing the uncertainties. Ultimately, many scholars have concluded that
the appropriateness and effectiveness of hedges, qualiﬁcations, and caveats is a matter of
context, purpose, and audience (Crismore and Vande Kopple 1990, 57; Jensen 2008,
362).
When turning to the accommodated science literature, a great deal has been
discovered. Scholars have determined that texts written primarily for scientists by
other scientists are more likely to have what Latour and Woolgar would call type
two and three statements, statements that are heavily hedged or qualiﬁed. There
is also ample evidence to suggest accommodated rhetoric written by journalists is
not heavily hedged, using what Latour and Woolgar would call type four and ﬁve
statements. These observations mesh nicely with Fahnestock’s observations about the
nature of accommodated rhetoric. However, returning to Fahnestock’s claims also
allows us to observe areas in the literature that have not yet been fully addressed. If
non-accommodated scientiﬁc texts (i.e., journal articles) can be argued to ﬁt into a
forensic genre and accommodated scientiﬁc texts (i.e., news stories) are said to ﬁt into
an epideictic genre, what have scholars discovered about accommodated rhetoric in
deliberative settings? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is “very little.” If the
use of hedging depends so heavily on context, purpose, and audience, not discussing
the use of accommodated rhetoric in deliberative settings (i.e., scientists testifying
before Congress) remains a glaring scholarly omission. Does hedging in deliberative
settings (where policymakers are concerned with making a decision about future action)
function the same way as hedging does in the learning scenarios observed by Crismore
and Vande Kopple? Should a perceived sense of urgency on the part of policymakers
inﬂuence a scientist’s decision to accommodate his or her rhetoric? By turning to James
Hansen’s 1980s testimonials, this article provides scholars with a case study that offers
answers to these questions. However, before turning to the actual testimonials, a few
contextual comments about James Hansen and the time period are in order.

James Hansen and the Scientiﬁc Testimony of the Late 1980s
James Hansen did not begin his career as someone interested in earthly global warming.
Instead, his interests were focused more on other planets. A longtime resident of
Denison, Iowa, Hansen received his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1967.
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Writing his dissertation on the climate of Venus under the tutelage of the accomplished
astronomer and physicist James Van Allen, Hansen later accepted a position working
on NASA’s Venus Project. When he accepted a job at NASA’s Goddard Institute, he
met Dr. Steven Schneider, who introduced to Hansen the possibility of global climate
change on Earth. Taking an interest in the subject, Hansen resigned his position on
the Venus Project to put all his efforts into developing and testing a computer model
of the Earth’s climate.
Hansen became one of the ﬁrst scientists to develop an initial computer model
that linked increasing global warming gases to temperature change. Hansen and others
noted that the temperature of the Earth would most likely increase approximately 3◦ C
in the twenty-ﬁrst century (Pomerance 1989, 260). However, scientiﬁc acceptance of
Hansen’s ideas was mixed at the time. This reaction was expected given the number
of scientists in the 1970s who claimed that the Earth could go into another ice age.
Hansen knew that few scientists were willing to say the global warming issue was
settled. However, ice drilling in Greenland and Antarctica during the early 1980s
further solidiﬁed Hansen’s belief about the threat of global climate change. In the late
1980s, spurred by extreme weather conditions, Congress invited Hansen to participate
in a number of hearings aimed at advising lawmakers about future directions for
environmental policy.
Hansen participated in three hearings that framed global warming for the general
public and policymakers. Consistent with standard Senate hearing practices, each day
of hearings had anywhere from six to twelve witnesses testifying to Senators who were
entering and leaving the hearings as their schedules dictated. No panel was made up
of more than six people. Each witness presented a summary of his or her written
statements that were made accessible to the Senators well before the witnesses actually
spoke. Before these hearings, few scientists had testiﬁed in Congress on global climate
change and few policymakers had thought it serious enough to warrant their attention.
The ﬁrst set of statements and summaries was given before the Senate subcommittee
on environmental pollution (a subcommittee of the committee on environment and
public works) on June 10 and 11, 1986. Chaired by Senator John H. Chafee of Rhode
Island, this hearing was convened to address both ozone and global climate change
issues (U.S. Congress 1986). The second collection of texts comes from statements
and summaries given before the Senate committee on energy and natural resources on
November 9 and 10, 1987. Chaired by Senator Tim E. Wirth of Colorado, this hearing
was convened largely due to the momentum generated by the ﬁrst hearing, as well
as scientiﬁc concerns about an increasingly bleak future (U.S. Congress 1987). Once
again, Hansen was invited to testify; but this time, global climate change was the only
issue dominating the discussion. The ﬁnal texts consist of the statements and summaries
given before the Senate committee on energy and natural resources on June 23, 1988.
Although the hearing was to be chaired by Senator J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana,
the duties were yielded to Senator Wirth. Thus, Hansen, along with a few other
witnesses, was a familiar face to policymakers and activists alike (U.S. Congress 1988).
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Hansen’s Rhetorical Accommodations
Studying Hansen’s three testimonies of the late 1980s gives science communication
scholars an opportunity to observe rhetorical changes made by a scientist speaking to
policymakers. Hansen’s three testimonies reveal a historically positioned scientist whose
rhetoric improved as he further understood the complexity of his circumstances. Every
change Hansen made for his 1988 testimony illustrates his growth as a rhetor cognizant
of his situation, a rhetor who accommodated his science to his non-scientiﬁc audience.
Hansen’s accommodations created the conditions necessary for him to gain the support
of prominent politicians and the attention of inﬂuential journalists.
In 1986, Hansen’s speech contained few elements of accommodation; instead,
Hansen’s rhetoric featured commentary on scientiﬁc methodology and the remaining
uncertainties in climate change science. Hansen began his speech by noting, “In my
brief summary this morning, I cannot describe the capabilities and limitations of
climate models in detail. But let me just say a few words about that before turning to
predictions of where our climate is heading” (U.S. Congress 1986, 18). The two-point
structure of his speech is clear. However, in both his speech and written statement, the
primary emphasis was not on his ﬁndings, but on the method he was developing to
arrive at ﬁndings.
More important than Hansen’s decision to start with methodological considerations
was the confusion that ensued due to information overload about his climate models.
This can be seen in the following exchange between Hansen and Senator Chafee:
Chafee: Don’t go too fast. Let’s make sure we understand what is what in these.
What are you showing here?
Hansen: Let me say, ﬁrst of all, these calculations were carried out by the Climate
Modeling Group at the Goddard Institute for Space Studies. The model
simulation begins in 1958, when CO2 began to be measured accurately,
and the model includes climate forcing due to measured changes in
CO2 , trace gases, and stratospheric aerosols for the period from 1958
to 1985.
For the future, we assume two scenarios. In scenario A, we used the
current growth rates for CO2 and trace gases. In scenario B, we used
growth rates which drop off rapidly as we go into the future. This map
shows the global warming in scenario A; that is, for the current growth
rates of CO2 and trace gases.
This map shows the global warming trend in the 1990 s as compared
to 1958. The scale for the warming in most of the United States is
about 1/2◦ C to 1◦ C, the patched green color. You cannot trust the
detailed geographical patterns of this predicted warming because of
natural climate variability. In fact, if you run the model twice, the
detailed patterns will change from one run to another. But note that
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there are similar warmings, warmings of similar magnitude, at other
regions at the same latitude as the United States.
So the magnitude of the warming is a ﬁrm model prediction, given
the assumptions that are in the model. A principal assumption is that
the sensitivity of the climate system is 4◦ C for doubled CO2 .
Chafee: Wait; let’s ﬁnish this graph. What is the green? How many degrees in
change? (Ibid. 19–20)
Although Hansen was attempting to make his scientiﬁc points about warming, listeners
had difﬁculty following his explanation. When prompted to not “go too fast,” Hansen
bolstered his credibility and defended the results through an invocation of authority by
referencing the Climate Modeling Group at the Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
However, this did little to explain to Senator Chafee and others what it was they were
seeing. Hansen’s introduction of commentary about when the data was collected, use
of technical vocabulary such as “climate forcing” and “trace gas,” uncertainty-creating
statements such as “you cannot trust the detailed geographical patterns,” and choice to
put all of this information into conversation with computer modeling efforts, proved
to be too much for many of the Senators. Hansen’s decision to emphasize how he
arrived at his conclusions, rather than emphasizing the conclusions ﬁrst, contributed
to the creation of uncertainty in 1986.
Hansen also increased the amount of uncertainty surrounding his predictions and
models in 1986 by placing hedges, qualiﬁcations, and modalities in close proximity to
the claim he was trying to make:
But I believe that climate models are good enough now to give us some strong indications
about the nature of climate changes which will occur because of the increasing CO2 and
trace gases, although a number of qualiﬁcations and caveats must accompany the results,
especially for the regional and the local scales, as I discussed in my written testimony.
(Ibid., 29)

In this excerpt, the introduction of uncertainty complicates one’s conﬁdence in the
claim that “models are good enough now” if there are still a number of “qualiﬁcations
and caveats.” Declarations such as this one put Hansen’s testimony on shaky grounds
for audience members. If the policymakers sought legislative guidance about the issue
or wished to inﬂuence public opinion, Hansen was not making this easy for them.
In his written statement, Hansen highlighted the idea of uncertainty in a variety of
places. Referring to his climate models, Hansen pointed out that when it came to
some regional predictions, such as foreseeing patterns of precipitation, the models
were “not sufﬁciently realistic” (ibid., 81). He also pointed out how representations
of ocean currents in climate models were “not sufﬁciently realistic to predict such
phenomenon” (ibid.). Despite Hansen’s conclusion in his 1986 written statement that
“evidence conﬁrming the essence of the greenhouse theory is already overwhelming,”
the bulk of his written statement reads more like a technical report designed to inform
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readers about what a climate model is, how it works, and what its limitations are, rather
than a statement offering conclusions from the actual use of the model. Hansen appeared
to be locked into a technical style that privileged what Gross calls the “suite of methods”
one could use to discover the material truths of the world (Gross 1996, 85). Overall,
then, Hansen’s speech and written testimony in 1986 featured questions of method as
much as conclusions and were ﬁlled with uncertainty-producing statements, hedges,
and modalities. Hansen’s 1986 speech did little to break away from what Fahnestock
would consider to be a non-accommodated from of scientiﬁc rhetoric.
Hansen’s 1987 speech contained a number of similarities to the 1986 speech. In
terms of organization, Hansen’s 1987 speech lacked a preview, but this is not to say
it was unorganized. Instead, audience members heard a one-sentence thesis: “I will
summarize the result of numerical simulations of the greenhouse effect, carried out
with colleagues at the Goddard Institute” (U.S. Congress 1987, 51). Although this
sentence implies Hansen was going to feature his “result,” this ended up not being the
case. As with his 1986 statement, Hansen’s 1987 statement more prominently featured
the methodology and uncertainties rather than his conclusions.
In 1987, Hansen once again made early and signiﬁcant use of the A and B models
with no results to show for it. One-third of the way into his speech, Hansen announced
which model he believed was the most likely scenario: “These scenarios are designed
speciﬁcally to cover a very broad range of cases. If I were forced to choose one of these
as most plausible, I would say Scenario B. My guess is that the world is now probably
following a course that will take it somewhere between A and B” (ibid., 51). Despite
Hansen’s belief that these models were of the utmost importance, and the obvious
contradiction between “guessing” B is the right model when the world is not moving
in that direction, no questions were dedicated to Hansen’s models in the question and
answer session. Policymakers spent little time trying to decipher the data and models,
thus missing one of Hansen’s main points: the importance of method.
Although Hansen did less to note the uncertainties in 1987 than he did in 1986,
they were still present throughout his discourse. Speaking about the future predictions
of his models, Hansen noted that “it is difﬁcult to predict reliably how trace gases will
continue to change” (ibid.). But this begs the question, “If you cannot feed reliable
variables into your climate models, how can one be sure the models produce reliable
results?” Hansen’s own observations about the limitations of his models contributed
to the creation of uncertainties. These statements reveal Hansen’s continued use of
modalities. By giving guesses and noting difﬁculties, Hansen’s testimony starts to feature
what Fahnestock, Latour, and Woolgar would call type two statements, statements
heavily hedged or qualiﬁed to the point of uncertainty.
In addition to Hansen modifying the strength of his claims, others also contributed
to the sense of uncertainty. On the second day of speeches, Clarence Brown, Deputy
Secretary of Commerce, provided testimony that was nothing short of a defense of the
status quo. He stated, “while experiments project an average global warming due to
increased carbon dioxide, no direct climate change due to increased carbon dioxide

James Hansen and Global Warming

147

has been conﬁrmed” (U.S. Congress 1987, 160). Brown also referenced the cooling
in temperature that took place from about 1940 to 1970. William Graham, Deputy
Administrator at NASA, also contributed to the uncertainty in 1987 in an exchange
with Senator Stafford:
Stafford: Now, let me be the devil’s advocate here for just a minute because one
of the witnesses this morning testiﬁed that between 1940 and 1970 the
globe was in a cooling trend, and that had to have been during a period
of very high use of both coal and other fossil fuels, and that from 1970
to the present there is undoubtedly a warming trend, which may also
be the result of greenhouse effect.
My question is: Could some other factor have inﬂuenced the cooling
trend from 1940 to 1970, and could it have been the Sun, for example,
or would you have any comment on that?
Graham: Yes; Senator Stafford. I think this illustrates the fact that we don’t fully
understand the mechanisms that drive the climate of the Earth or the
interaction of a number of the phenomena that we observe today on
the climate and on other parts of the environment. (Ibid., 171)
What Graham was pointing out when he mentioned “mechanisms that drive the
climate of the Earth,” were some of the mechanisms Hansen mentioned in 1986, such
as the role of oceans in the transfer of heat. Similar to the 1986 hearing, the 1987
hearing produced little attention.
Both Hansen and Wirth were aware that the earlier hearings had failed to arouse the
kind of interest and attention that was needed to push global climate change onto the
front burner of congressional politics. They were also aware that something needed to
change. In conversations with Wirth, Hansen suggested maximizing the possibility of
success by timing the speech to coincide with weather conditions that would be more
amenable to a general audience. Although the 1986 hearing was held in June, a time
of the year that seemed right for Hansen, the 1987 hearing was held on a rainy day in
November. According to William K. Stevens, Hansen argued after his 1987 testimony
that “people would pay attention to global warming only if the hearing were held in
the summer, when it was hot” (Stevens 1999, 131). The selection of a June hearing was
not accidental; Hansen was deliberately attempting to create conditions for rhetorical
success. According to Weart, Wirth agreed to hold the 1988 hearing during June once
again, despite the summer being “hardly a normal time for politicians who sought
attention” (Weart 2003, 155). Wirth also aided Hansen in creating better conditions
for success by altering the order of speakers on the day Hansen was scheduled to testify.
According to Stevens, “Wirth told Hansen that he was shifting the order of testimony
so that Hansen could go ﬁrst, in case the television cameras left early” (Stevens 1999,
132). Hansen’s rhetoric beneﬁted from the favorable conditions leading up to the 1988
hearing: the summer of 1988 was one of the hottest on record, Wirth changed the order
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for Hansen to be featured ﬁrst, and, most importantly, Hansen ﬁnally accommodated
his rhetoric to his audience.
In 1988, Hansen used a very concise style and organization. Consistent with what
Fahnestock has noted about accommodated science, Hansen began with his conclusions
instead of methodological concerns. After thanking the Chairman for allowing him to
testify, Hansen then immediately said the following:
I would like to draw three main conclusions. Number one, the earth is warmer in 1988
than at any time in the history of instrumental measurements. Number two, the global
warming is now large enough that we can ascribe with a high degree of conﬁdence a
cause and effect relationship to the greenhouse effect. And number three, our computer
climate simulations indicate that the greenhouse [e]ffect is already large enough to begin
to effect the probability of extreme events such as summer heat waves. (U.S. Congress
1988, 39)

Similarly, in the second paragraph of his written, prepared statement that was circulated
to the Senators, Hansen wrote:
My principal conclusions are: (1) the earth is warmer in 1988 than at any other time
in the history of instrumental measurements, (2) the global warming is now sufﬁciently
large that we can ascribe with a high degree of conﬁdence a cause and effect relationship
to the greenhouse effect, and (3) in our computer climate simulations the greenhouse
effect now is already large enough to begin to affect the probability of occurrence of
extreme weather events such as summer heat waves; the model results imply that heat
wave/drought occurrences in the Southeast and Midwest United States may be more
frequent in the next decade than in climatological (1950–1980) statistics. (Ibid., 43)

Comparing these two excerpts illustrates Hansen’s dedication to having his spoken
testimony remain consistent with his written statement. In addition, Hansen’s mention
of “extreme weather events such as summer heat waves” while the summer of 1988
burned its way into American memory was not coincidental. He adapted his rhetoric
to those conditions without making the unscientiﬁc claim (at the time) that 1988 was
causally related to global climate change. Hansen also shows signs of being a seasoned
public speaker through his decision to omit extraneous details related to his claim.
Although his written testimony provides more details, such as speciﬁc regions of the
nation (the Southeast and Midwest) that were breaking temperature records, Hansen
chose to leave this information out of his speech. The end result was that the claims
were easier for audiences to digest.
In 1988, Hansen again mentioned computer models, but his discussion created less
confusion than in 1986. This was, in part, due to the clear and unambiguous statements
Hansen made about his level of certainty in the scenarios. But more importantly,
Hansen related what he was showing on his viewgraphs to real world conditions for
the ﬁrst time in the three years. For example:
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My ﬁrst viewgraph . . . shows the global temperature over the period of instrumental
records which is about 100 years. The present temperature is the highest in the period
of record. The rate of warming in the past 25 years, as you can see on the right, is the
highest on record. The four warmest years, as the Senator mentioned, have all been in
the 1980 s. And 1988 so far is so much warmer than 1987, that barring a remarkable and
improbable cooling, 1988 will be the warmest year on record. (Ibid., 39)

For the lay listeners at the hearings, Hansen’s presentation was much clearer in 1988 than
in 1986 or 1987. The inclusion of weather conditions that policymakers were living
through made the presentation of temperature charts and computer simulations more
palatable, while starting with his conclusions made his testimony easier to understand.
If the message Hansen was delivering in the early years was perceived as muddled and
confused, his 1988 testimony seemed crystal clear.
The level of uncertainty found in Hansen’s 1988 testimony also differed signiﬁcantly
from earlier years. Although Hansen still wanted to understand some of the processes
that were unclear to him, he only dedicated one sentence to that issue in his 1988
speech: “Finally, I would like to stress that there is a need for improving these global
climate models, and there is a need for global observations if we’re going to obtain a full
understanding of these phenomena” (ibid., 41). This sentence’s placement at the end
of Hansen’s testimony gives it the appearance of being more of an afterthought than
an important point in his presentation. In addition, the language itself makes it seem as
though the additional improvements he is referring to are part of a natural progression
associated with scientiﬁc work rather than limitations associated with the current state
of knowledge. In his written testimony, the idea of uncertainty comes up in a few
additional instances, but it is not enough to detract from the weight of his argument.
For example, Hansen noted that there were “major uncertainties” in his climate models
due to “global climate sensitivity” and “heat uptake and transport by the ocean,” but
he concludes this section of his written statement with an overwhelmingly certain
declaration: “Global warming has reached a level such that we can ascribe with a high
degree of conﬁdence a cause and effect relationship between the greenhouse effect and
the observed warming” (ibid., 44). The notion of uncertainty is present in Hansen’s
1988 testimony, but is signiﬁcantly downplayed. Add to this Hansen’s continuous use of
clear and certain language throughout his presentation, and an audience is much more
likely to see Hansen’s request for additional research as an attempt to further reﬁne an
already decided matter. Hansen’s comments about the “clear signs of the greenhouse
effect,” the “clear tendencies” in the data, the observation of a “very strong case,” as
well as changes “large enough to be noticeable to the average person” minimize any
uncertainty creation the last sentence of his presentation may have displayed (ibid.,
40–41).
When examining Hansen’s 1986, 1987, and 1988 speeches and written statements,
deﬁnite signs of rhetorical accommodations emerge from his 1988 rhetoric,
accommodations attributable to Hansen’s growth as a rhetor responding to his given
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constraints. First, Hansen, aided by Wirth, attempted to create the conditions that
would improve his chances of success. Second, Hansen did more to emphasize his
conclusions rather than his method. Third, Hansen reduced the number of hedges,
qualiﬁcations, and modalities that would have created a sense of uncertainty. The
rhetoric of the late 1980 s indicates Hansen was a rhetor who came to terms with his
situation: Hansen became a better rhetor as he learned from his previous experiences
and accommodated his rhetoric accordingly.

Conclusion
This article has explored why Hansen is recognized as a key scientist in the global
climate change debates of the late 1980s: his rhetoric of accommodated science was
positioned in a favorable environmental and rhetorical situation. In the end, can
Hansen’s testimony be said to be the only reason for the increase in policymakers’
concerns or the increased media coverage of environmental issues? No. Weather
conditions, political interests, and other external circumstances certainly contributed to
Hansen’s success and constrained his available rhetorical options. However, the success
of Hansen and his rhetorical choices are difﬁcult to deny. A search of the Lexis-Nexis
database for news stories that mention Hansen adds support to this claim. Before 1988,
Hansen’s speeches about climate change were virtually ignored. The Washington Post
published one article on his 1986 testimony and was silent in 1987 (Peterson 1986).
The New York Times published one article on a speech Hansen delivered in 1982, but
nothing for his 1986 or 1987 testimonials (Anon. 1982). But 1988 was signiﬁcantly
different. The Washington Post quoted directly from Hansen’s testimony that, “The
greenhouse effect has been detected and it is changing our climate now” (Weisskopf
1988, A4.) The New York Times not only featured Hansen in a front page article,
quoting from his speech multiple times, but it also featured a line from him in the
“Quotation of the Day” section of the paper (Shabecoff 1988a). Articles referencing
Hansen’s speech also appeared in August and December, months after he had delivered
it (Wilford 1988; Shabecoff 1988b). Even international newspapers, such as London’s
The Times, featured stories on his testimony (Binton 1988). Furthermore, attention
to Hansen’s speech was not isolated to newspapers. According to Stephen Schneider,
Hansen’s claims amassed an impressive amount of press coverage across a variety of
media outlets: “Jim appeared on a dozen or more national television programs, was
quoted in a front-page story in the New York Times, and even showed up on David
Brinkley’s Sunday television program sporting a large pair of dice on which he painted
some faces to represent more warm years” (Schneider 1990, 195). Through a number
of rhetorical adjustments in a fortunate set of circumstances, Hansen managed to use his
testimony to thrust global climate change issues into the public spotlight. Initially, my
analysis has illustrated one way scientists can, and do, develop a rhetorical sensitivity in
light of their rhetorically constrained situations. James Hansen did not simply get lucky
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in 1988; he accommodated his rhetoric to maximize its effectiveness by emphasizing
conclusions rather than method and by reducing the use of qualiﬁcations, hedges, and
modalities.
My analysis also contributes to our understanding of accommodated rhetoric in
deliberative settings. As Hansen encountered a change in genre from the forensic
to the deliberative, his rhetoric was accommodated in such a way that hedges and
modalities were downplayed in favor of featuring his ﬁndings. This case study offers
one example of how accommodated science rhetoric functions in the deliberative
sphere of politics, an area Fahnestock noticeably omitted in her classic treatment of
the subject. This essay also suggests accommodated rhetoric functions effectively in
situations where policymakers are faced with a sense of urgency. However, scientists
who choose to accommodate their rhetoric to non-scientist audiences should be
cautious when speaking to policymakers in similar situations. As questions of method
are replaced with claims of certainty, scientists run the risk of overstepping their bounds
of expertise as they are asked to move from being technical advisors to being legislative
authors. Hansen encountered this very issue. When Senator Chafee asked Hansen
what he would do about the global warming problem if he were made king, Hansen
answered, “I am sorry if I sound more like a befuddled scientist rather than a king, but I
would like to understand the problem better before I order any dramatic actions” (U.S.
Congress 1986, 29). Hansen’s response was simply to maintain his scientist persona, a
refusal to step outside of the very persona that generated his credibility to begin with.
Crafting his testimonies in the late 1980s was certainly no simple charge; but,
Hansen has shown he was up to the task and that this kind of communication could
be accomplished with success. Troubled by skeptics who revisit his 1988 claims in
order to shed doubt on the realities of global climate change, James Hansen posted a
short commentary on the Goddard Institute for Space Studies’ website. Reﬂecting on
his experiences as a scientist who often communicates with non-scientist audiences,
he said: “But one quickly learns that such communication is not easy, at least not for
many of us” (Hansen 1999). Indeed, a great deal is left to be understood about scientiﬁc
accommodations in deliberative settings before they can be classiﬁed as comfortable
rhetorical practices.
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